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Abstract
This paper studies ATM coalitions in retail banking. We ask when
it is pro¯table for banks to make agreements which ban direct ATM
transaction fees. In the case of a coalition banks loose income from
ATM transactions but relax competition in the banking market. We
¯nd that such agreements are pro¯table when the interchange fee is
su±ciently high. When banks can collude on the interchange they
always form a coalition. Coalitions may harm consumers but lead to
higher total welfare. Moreover, we ¯nd that smaller banks have larger
incentives to form ATM coalitions. Investment in ATM networks is
typically higher with a coalition.
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11 Introduction
Banks o®er a variety of services to their customers. For instance, they pro-
vide consumers with account and payment services, give investment advice
or grant credit facilities. Additionally, banks provide customers with ATM
services, that is, facilities to withdraw money outside their own branches.
Competition in ATM markets will be the focus of this paper.
The ATM market is interesting as several di®erent fees can be applied to
one transaction. When a depositor of a bank makes a foreign withdrawal,
that is, he withdraws money from an ATM which is not owned by the bank
where he has an account, up to three di®erent fees can be charged: a foreign
fee, a surcharge fee, and an interchange fee. A foreign fee is a fee that is
charged by the cardholder's bank to the depositor. The cardholder can also
be charged by the ATM owner via a surcharge fee. Finally, there may be an
interchange fee from the cardholder's bank to the ATM owner.
Pricing of ATM services di®ers widely among countries. In the US, for
instance, all three possible fees are applied to foreign withdrawals. Consumer
pay high direct transaction fees for getting cash. In contrast, in Finland or
in Belgium there are no direct usage fees. The same is true for the UK. Here
the majority of ATMs operated through the LINK system can be accessed
without charges. Finally, in some countries only surcharge fees are applied
to foreign withdrawals. This is (at least partially) the case, for instance, in
Germany.
The present paper focuses on banks' preferences towards these di®erent pric-
ing structures and asks which pricing structure emerges when banks can
coordinate on a speci¯c structure. There is some evidence that banks co-
operate in their choice of pricing. In Germany some banks have entered
mutually into agreements with each other to exempt their customers mutu-
ally from surcharge and foreign fees, that is, customers of a bank A can also
use ATMs owned by bank B without any charges, and vice versa. There are
several competing industry associations which have been forcefully marketed
by the participating banks under the names `Cash Group' and `CashPool'.1
Inside these association foreign withdrawals are costless for consumer, but
surcharges are charged when using an ATM of a competing banking as-
sociation. That is in Germany, there are two pricing structures. Further
examples for banking cooperation on price structur are Finland and Bel-
gium. In these two countries there exists a single ATM network in which
1These agreements exempt depositors of one participating bank of any charges when
using ATMs owned by another participating bank. The `Cash Group' consists of Com-
merzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Hypovereinsbank and the Postbank. `Cash-
Pool' is a similar arrangement between various smaller banks. The Sparkassen-association
has a similar agreement among their members.
2nearly all banks participate (Ferrari, Verboven, and Degryse, 2007; Snellman
and Viren, 2006).2
Guided from the experience within Germany, and across the US versus Bel-
gium and Finland, our speci¯c focus is on a comparison between two pricing
structures. We compare the incentives to choose between two pricing menus:
In one, banks can apply all three possible fees to foreign transactions (US)
while in the second there are no direct usage fees for consumers (Finland
and Belgium). We will analyze these choices in symmetric and asymmetric
banking industries. We also study investment behavior in the ATM network
induced by the di®erent pricing structures.
At a ¯rst glance, it is not clear why banks should agree not to charge cer-
tain services, that is, waive revenues from ATM services. According to this
intuition consumers should bene¯t by these agreements as a larger ATM
network is available without any charges.. However, this intuition lacks the
insight that the market for ATM transactions and the market for deposit
accounts (or ATM cards) is linked. The purpose of the present paper is
to shed light on the question when and why banks make such agreements
and waive revenues from ATM transactions. In line with other theoretical
studies in ATM markets we will show that by exempting customers from
ATM usage fees, banks can weaken competition in the market for banking
services, and thereby increase account fees. The reason for this result lies in
the impact of interchange fees on the degree of banking competition. Previ-
ous literature has shown that collectively set interchange fees may serve as
a device to relax competition in the banking market (Matutes and Padilla,
1994; Donze and Dubec, 2006; Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and San-
tamaria, 2007). However, it is also known that this impact of interchange
fees is o®set if banks charge consumers surcharge and foreign fees addition-
ally. Thus, by banning direct usage fees on ATM transaction, banks can
decrease competition for customers and increase their income from account
fees. When the increase in pro¯ts due to weaker competition is larger than
the loss in revenues from ATM transactions, banks enter into agreements to
ban direct usage fees. As the motive not to charge direct ATM usage fees is
a strategic one we call this type of cooperation a strategic ATM coalition.
We construct a duopoly model of banking competition where consumers
derive bene¯ts from general banking services and ATM services. In the base
model, two banks with symmetric ATM networks have the option to form
a strategic ATM coalition. If they form one, they waive direct ATM usage
fees. If they decide not to, consumers are charged for the use of foreign
ATMs. In the model, consumers decide which bank to join and whether or
not to withdraw money from an ATM. In this setup, we ¯nd that banks enter
2In Finland and in Belgium (until recently) cooperation between banks goes further
than in Germany. Decisions about ATM deployment are also made at a cooperative level.
3a strategic ATM coalition when the interchange fee is su±ciently high. By
forming a coalition, banks can use interchange fees and hence high account
fees to capture consumer surplus. Furthermore, when banks can determine
the interchange fee cooperatively they choose an interchange fee that is
so high that it is always pro¯table to form a coalition. The reason is that
via abandoning direct ATM usage charges banks can implement the optimal
ATM use whose bene¯ts can extracted via a ¯xed fee (account fee). Turning
to welfare implications, we ¯nd that ATM coalitions may reduce consumers
surplus if the interchange fee is too high as most of the surplus is captured
via high account fees. These account fees, however, have no impact on total
welfare as they constitute transfers between consumers and banks. Total
welfare depends solely on the e±ciency of ATM use. When banks form a
coalition ATM use is e±cient such that total welfare is higher with an ATM
coalition.
Extending the base model, we depart from the assumption of symmetric
network sizes. We analyze the case where one bank operates a larger network
than its competitor. In the case of direct ATM usage charges this introduces
an aspect of vertical di®erentiation among banks. Consumers prefer banks
with a large own network which can be used without charges. A large
network of the foreign bank is costly for consumers. Forming a coalition,
and hence abandoning foreign and surcharge fees, eliminates this vertical
di®erentiation. The network of both banks can be accessed by depositors
without costs. This in turn leads to banks with smaller networks having a
stronger incentive to form an ATM coalition. Consequently, it can also be
shown that the formation of coalitions is more likely when banks' networks
are of similar size. We also consider the incentives to invest in the size of
the ATM network. Provided that the interchange fee is su±ciently high we
¯nd that ATM deployment is higher when banks have formed a coalition.
Thus, high interchange fees provide powerful incentives for investment.
The incentives to form agreements which ban voluntarily ATM transac-
tion charges is also studied in Croft and Spencer (2004). In contrast to
the present paper, they only consider the incentive to ban surcharges. The
present paper considers agreements to ban all direct charges on customers,
that is, surcharge and foreign fees. Both, the present paper and the model
in Croft and Spencer (2004) consider the implications for asymmetric banks.
However, the papers di®er in the way asymmetry is introduced. In Croft and
Spencer (2004) banks may di®er in customer base, while in the present paper
banks can di®er in the size of their ATM networks. Consumers choice which
bank to choose is endogenous in our approach. This di®erence also leads to
di®erent conclusions. Croft and Spencer (2004) conclude that large banks
have stronger incentives to agree on no-surcharging agreements. In contrast,
the present paper, comes to the opposite result, namely that smaller banks
have the stronger incentive. Moreover, in contrast to Croft and Spencer
4(2004), the present paper considers the welfare implications of ATM coali-
tions and the incentives to invest in ATM networks.
There is a growing literature concerned with ATM networks|both theoreti-
cal and empirical. For a recent review see the article by McAndrews (2003).
On the theoretical side, Matutes and Padilla (1994) study the question of
compatibility of ATM networks. Donze and Dubec (2006) study the impact
of interchange fees on the degree of banking competition and ATM deploy-
ment. In a model without surcharge and foreign fees, they show that inter-
change fees can be used as a collusive device. Furthermore, ATM deployment
is too high from a welfare point of view as banks deploy ATMs aggressively
in order to earn interchange fees. Massoud and Bernhardt (2005) are also
concerned with ATM deployment. They ¯nd that there is overprovision of
ATMs. The reason is that banks can use these ATMs to extract pro¯ts from
non-depositors. The question whether surcharging should be banned is stud-
ied in several papers (Massoud and Bernhardt, 2002; Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller,
Sandonis, and Santamaria, 2007; Fauli-Oller, 2007; McAndrews, 2001; Croft
and Spencer, 2004). However, results are mixed. In Massoud and Bernhardt
(2002) and Croft and Spencer (2004), surcharges should be banned, while
in Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and Santamaria (2007) and Fauli-Oller
(2007) they should be allowed.
On the empirical side there is also a growing interest on outcomes in ATM
markets. There is particular interest in the impact of surcharging on mar-
ket outcomes. The impact of surcharging on competition between large and
small banks is studied by Prager (2001) and Massoud, Saunders, and Schol-
nick (2006). The impact of surcharging on market concentration is studies in
Hannan (2007). Hannan and Borzekowski (2007) and Ishii (2005) consider
surcharging and investment in ATM networks. Knittel and Stango (2008b)
establish empirically strategic motives to excessively increase surcharge fees
to gain a competitive advantage. Knittel and Stango (2008a) explore the
welfare e®ects of surcharging. They ¯nd that surcharging increases welfare
by leading to more ATM deployment.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model framework.
Section 3 analyzes the case when banks do not form an ATM coalition, that
is, they charge ATM usage fees. Section 4 studies the outcome when banks
form a coalition in order to abstain from ATM usage fees. Section 5 analyzes
the incentives to form an ATM coalition, while section 6 looks at welfare
consequences. Section 7 studies coalitions among banks with asymmetric
networks. Section 8 studies investment in ATM networks. Finally, section
9 concludes.
52 The model
This section introduces the model. We use a setup similar to Chioveanu,
Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and Santamaria (2007) and Croft and Spencer (2004).
Banks
We consider a duopoly banking market. Two banks are located at the outer
extremes of a [0,1] - line. Bank 1 is located at zero, while bank 2 is located
at one. The banks provide two services: general banking services and ATM
services.
The costs for providing these services is normalized to zero. A bank can
charge customers an account fee, Fi, for the general banking services when
a consumer opens an account with the bank. They can also charge for the
use of ATM services. We assume that banks do not charge `on-us' fees, that
is, customers of bank i can use its ATMs without charges.3 The ATM use
of a customer of bank i of an ATM owned by bank j involves three di®erent
fees. First, bank j can charge a surcharge fee, sj, directly to the consumer.
Second, bank j can charge bank i an interchange fee, a. Third, bank i can
charge its customer a foreign fee, fi.
We study the question when it is bene¯cial for banks to make agreements
to ban direct fees for ATM transactions. We thus contrast two di®erent
scenarios. Banks can make an agreement to ban direct ATM transaction
fees on customers, that is, surcharges and foreign fees are not allowed. In-
terchange fees between banks are still possible. We will call this agreement
a strategic ATM coalition. We contrast this with the outcome when banks
charge direct ATM transaction fees for foreign withdrawals.4
Consumers
Consumers are located uniformly on the same [0,1]-line. The variable x de-
notes the location of a consumer. The number of consumers is normalized
to one. They derive utility from the two services provided by the banking
industry. When opening an account with a bank, consumers get a gross util-
ity of V from the general banking service. Consumers' transportation costs
3The price for on-us withdrawals can be viewed as included in the account fee Fi.
4Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and Santamaria (2007) compare ATM pricing with
and without surcharges while foreign fees are always applied. In our setup, an agreement
not to charge surcharge and foreign fees always leads to higher pro¯ts than an agreement
that only bans surcharges while still charging foreign fees. That is in our model banks do
not have an incentive to ban only surcharges.
6are linear in distance. There is a parameter t associated with transportation
costs.
The second source of utility for consumers are ATM services, that is, the pos-
sibility to withdraw money at ATM machines. We assume that consumers
experience a(n) (unanticipated) need for cash and search for an ATM. With
a probability of P1 a consumer ¯nds an ATM of bank 1, and with probability
P2 he ¯nds an ATM of bank 2.5 These probabilities depend on the size of
the ATM networks. In the base model, we assume that these probabilities
are exogenous.6 We assume that P1 + P2 · 1. Hence, a consumer may not
¯nd any ATM. In the base model, we assume additionally that network sizes
are identical and hence, P1 = P2 = P. Later, we drop this assumption and
analyze asymmetric networks. If a consumer ¯nds an ATM, the gross bene¯t
of an ATM transaction is v. We assume that v is uniformly distributed on
[0,1], that is, consumers have di®erent valuations for withdrawing money.
Fees for the withdrawal are subtracted from the gross utility. In case a
consumer does not ¯nd any ATM he receives zero utility.
Total consumer utility then is:
U = V ¡ tdi ¡ Fi + uATM; (1)
where di denotes the distance between consumer and bank i's location, and
uATM is the utility provided by ATM services.









Assumption 1 ensures that all consumers choose to open an account in the
case when banks do not form a coalition. That is the market is covered.
Timing
We assume the following time structure:
5This search behavior by consumers is in contrast to spatial ATM models where con-
sumers know the location of ATMs and decide over ATM use in terms of distance and
prices. An example for this approach is Croft and Spencer (2004) or Matutes and Padilla
(1994). In the present model, consumers do not know ATM locations. They search for an
ATM and decide on the use of the ¯rst one they encounter. A similar approach is used in
Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and Santamaria (2007) and Fauli-Oller (2007).
6In section 8, we will depart from this assumption and analyze the incentives to invest
in the size of the ATM network.
7Stage 1: Banks decide whether to form an ATM coalition
Stage 2: Banks decide cooperatively on the interchange fee (a)
Stage 3: Banks set account fees, Fi, non-cooperatively
Stage 4: Consumers decide where to open an account
Stage 5: Banks decide on ATM usage fees (surcharge si and foreign fee fi)
non-cooperatively in case of no coalition
Stage 6: Consumers valuation for ATM services is drawn from v, and con-
sumers decide on ATM use
This time structure assumes that banks decide on transaction costs after
consumers have chosen banks. Hence, ATM transaction costs cannot be
used strategically to attract customers. This time structure|also employed
in Croft and Spencer (2004) and Chioveanu, Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and San-
tamaria (2007)|assumes a lock-in of consumers.7 As is current practice, we
assume that interchange fees are set collectively by banks. In the following,
we will analyze this six-stage game. We look for a subgame perfect equilib-
rium.
3 No strategic ATM coalition
We start by analyzing the outcome when banks do not form a strategic ATM
coalition. In this case, direct transaction fees for consumers are charged
when using a foreign ATM. Additionally, interchange fees between banks
can be charged.
Consumer deciding on ATM use
In stage 6, consumers encounter an ATM with an exogenous probability
and decide whether to use it or not. The bene¯t a consumer derives from
withdrawing money is a random draw of v. If a consumer encounters an
ATM he compares the bene¯ts with the costs.
When using an ATM owned by j, a customer of bank i has to pay foreign
fees (fi) charged by his own bank and surcharges (sj) charged by the ATM
owner. Thus, a consumer uses a foreign ATM if v > fi + sj. The random
7In an extension to their model, Croft and Spencer (2004) also analyze the case when
ATM usage fees are set at the same stage as account fees. Then, ATM usage fees can be
used strategically to attract customers. They show that with this time structure foreign
fees are lower to make own accounts more attractive and that surcharges are higher to
make rivals' accounts less attractive.
8variable v is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Hence, a fraction (1¡fi¡sj) of
consumers uses the foreign ATM. Note that in the presence of surcharge and
foreign fees, ATM use is ine±ciently low. As there are no costs associated
with the withdrawal of money, the e±cient benchmark is that all consumers
decide to withdraw.
Banks choosing transaction fees
In stage 5, banks set foreign and surcharge fees non-cooperatively. The
interchange fee a is exogenous at this stage. As consumers have already
chosen where to open an account, banks set these fees to maximize pro¯ts
from ATM operations.
Banks receive revenues from depositors as well as from non-depositors. Own
transactions are irrelevant for pro¯ts as they are priced at zero. Let ¹ x denote
the share of depositors at bank 1, and (1 ¡ ¹ x) the share of depositors at
bank 2. If a depositor of bank 2 uses an ATM of bank 1, bank 1 receives
a surcharge and an interchange fee. The fraction of bank 2 depositors that
encounter an ATM of bank 1, is (1 ¡ ¹ x)P. Of those a fraction of (1 ¡ s1 ¡
f2) decides to withdraw money. Hence, revenues from non-depositors are
(1¡ ¹ x)P(1¡s1¡f2)(s1+a). From depositors banks receive foreign fees but
have to pay an interchange fee to the ATM owner (f1 ¡ a). The fraction of
consumer encountering and using a foreign ATM is ¹ xP(1¡s2 ¡f1). Hence,
total revenues from depositors are ¹ xP(1¡s2 ¡f1)(f1 ¡a). Taken together,
the pro¯ts bank 1 receives from ATM transactions can be expressed as
¦ATM
1 = (1 ¡ ¹ x)P(1 ¡ s1 ¡ f2)(s1 + a) + ¹ xP(1 ¡ s2 ¡ f1)(f1 ¡ a): (2)
A similar expression holds for bank 2. Banks decide non-cooperatively on
their charges. Maximizing pro¯ts leads to the following fees: s¤ = 1
3 ¡a and
f¤ = 1
3+a. The total price for using a foreign ATM is then s¤+f¤ = 2
3. Note
that the total costs of ATM use are higher than the costs, thus, ATM use at
foreign ATMs is ine±ciently low. Note also that this price is independent
of the interchange fee.
Inserting equilibrium charges into pro¯ts from ATM transactions yields
^ ¦ATM
1 = P
9 , which is also independent of the interchange fee. This irrele-
vance result of the interchange fee when additionally surcharge and foreign
fees are applied emerges also in Croft and Spencer (2004) and Chioveanu,
Fauli-Oller, Sandonis, and Santamaria (2007).
Consumer choosing banks
In stage 4, consumers decide at which bank to open an account. The ex-
pected utility a consumer derives from ATM transaction consists of three
9parts. With probability P, the consumer encounters an ATM of the bank
where he is depositor, leading to expected utility of 1
2. With the same
probability of P, he encounters an ATM of the foreign bank, leading to an
expected utility of 1
18.8 With a probability of (1¡2P), he does not ¯nd any
ATM and receives zero utility.
Taking gross bene¯ts from general banking services, account fees and trans-
portation costs into account, the utility of a consumer x when joining bank
1 and bank 2, respectively, are:






















As banks are symmetric market share is only determined by account fees.
Consumers with a lower value of ¹ x choose bank 1, while those with a higher
value choose bank 2. The market share of bank 1 is ¹ x and that of bank 2 is
(1 ¡ ¹ x).
Banks choosing account fees
In stage 3, banks set account fees non-cooperatively. Taking into account
pro¯ts from the ATM transactions, pro¯ts of the two banks are:








Maximization of pro¯ts leads to account fees of F1 = F2 = F = t. As-
sumption 1 ensures that the market is covered, that is, all consumers choose
to open an account. Inserting the equilibrium account fee into the pro¯t








8To withdraw non-depositors pay total fees of
2
3, that is only those consumers with
v ¸
2
3 withdraw. Hence, a priori with a probability of
2
3 a consumer does not use the
ATM and receives zero utility. With a probability of
1
3 a consumer withdraws. In this















10The ¯rst part expresses pro¯ts from account fees, the latter term is the pro¯t
from ATM transactions. Pro¯ts increase with network size as a larger net-
work leads to more ATM transactions. Furthermore, higher transportation
costs t lead to larger pro¯ts as competition between banks is weaker.
4 Strategic ATM coalition
Suppose now that banks have formed a coalition and have agreed not to
charge surcharge and foreign fees. Thus, there are no transaction costs for
consumers for using ATMs|neither for using own bank's nor for foreign
bank's ATMs. The only fee that is involved in ATM transactions is the
interchange fee between banks. In contrast to the section above, interchange
fees now become relevant. As in the model by Donze and Dubec (2006),
interchange fees now serve as collusive device to reduce the intensity of
competition.
Consumer deciding on ATM use
As banks charge neither foreign fees nor surcharge fees, ATM transactions
are without costs for consumers. Each consumer uses the ATM he encoun-
ters, and hence, ATM use is e±cient.
Banks choosing transaction fees
Banks have agreed not to charge transaction fees.
Consumer choosing banks
In stage 4, consumers choose at which bank to open an account. Consumers
encounter and use an ATM with probability 2P. Hence, the expected utility
from ATM transactions is 1
22P = P.
The utility for a consumer x when choosing bank 1 is:
U1 = V ¡ tx ¡ F1 + P: (9)
The utility when choosing bank 2 is:
U2 = V ¡ t(1 ¡ x) ¡ F2 + P: (10)








11Banks choosing account fees
In stage 3, banks set account fees non-cooperatively as to maximize their
pro¯ts. Pro¯ts consist of two parts: Account fees and interchange income
from ATM transactions. Pro¯ts of bank 1 and 2 are:
¦1 = ¹ xF1 |{z}
Account fee income
+ (1 ¡ ¹ x)Pa
| {z }
Interchange fees received
¡ ¹ xPa |{z}
Interchange fees paid
; (12)
¦2 = ¹ (1 ¡ x)F2 | {z }
Account fee income
+ ¹ xPa |{z}
Interchange fees received




Maximizing pro¯ts with respect to F1 and F2, respectively, and solving for
equilibrium values yield the following account fees chosen by both banks:
F¤ = F¤
1 = F¤
2 = t + 2Pa: (14)
Higher interchange fees and larger network sizes lead unambiguously to
higher account fees. Higher interchange fees lead to a higher price by weak-
ening competition for customers. As banks can earn fees from non-depositors
via ATM transactions they are less keen on attracting customers (Donze and
Dubec, 2006).9 Note that in equilibrium interchange fees paid and received
exactly cancel.





t + aP: (15)
This equation gives banks' pro¯ts when the interchange fee is exogenous. As
pro¯ts increase with the interchange fee banks have an incentive to collude
on a high interchange fee.
5 The incentives to form a strategic ATM coali-
tion and the choice of the interchange fee
This section studies the incentives to form an ATM coalition and the choice
of the interchange fee. Agreeing not to charge direct ATM fees to consumers
invokes a trade-o®. When banks do not form a coalition they receive pro¯ts
9In telecommunication industries a similar result may arise. There access fees to access
rivals' networks can act as a device of collusion (Armstrong, 1998; La®ont, Rey, and Tirole,
1998).
12from both account fees and ATM transactions paid by depositors. When
they form a coalition, banks receive only income from account fees (inter-
change fees paid and received cancel), which are, however, higher than in
the no-coalition case. Banks form a strategic coalition whenever the prof-
its from higher account fees are higher than the loss in income from ATM
transactions. In Croft and Spencer (2004) banks may form coalitions for a
di®erent reason. Banks make agreements as surcharging raises the price of
ATM transactions above the level that maximizes joint pro¯ts. By banning
transaction fees, banks can increase their pro¯ts.
We start to analyze the incentives to form a coalition by focusing on an
exogenous interchange fee. Comparing pro¯ts (given by equations (8) and
(15)), we can derive the following result:
Result 1 When the interchange fee is exogenous, banks form a coalition
whenever a > 1
9.
The intuition behind this result is clear. As a high interchange fee increases
pro¯ts only in the case of a coalition, and not in the case of no coalition,
banks ¯nd it pro¯table to form coalition if the interchange fee is su±ciently
high.
Now we consider the case of an endogenous interchange fee. We assume
here that banks set the interchange cooperatively. As pro¯ts for both banks
increase in the interchange fee, banks set the highest interchange fee possible.
The highest possible interchange fee|assuming that banks want to serve all
consumers|is the interchange fee that makes the marginal consumer located
at x = 1
2 just indi®erent between opening an account and not opening:
V ¡ F(a¤) + P ¡
1
2









Note that higher transportation costs lead to a lower interchange fee. When
transportation costs are high, consumers are less willing to travel, and hence
banks have to charge lower account fees (interchange fees) to get consumers
opening an account. Thus, interchange fees are high when competition be-
tween banks is high (low t) and they are low when competition is tough
(high t). Given this interchange fee account fees are F = V + P ¡ 1
2t.
Inserting the optimal interchange fee into equation (15) yields the pro¯ts








13Note that pro¯ts increase with the gross bene¯t of general banking services
as they can be captured via higher account fees. Interestingly, pro¯ts de-
crease with transportation costs, that is weaker competition among banks
leads to lower pro¯ts. As already indicated above, there are two e®ects at
work here|a direct and an indirect one. The direct e®ect is that for given
interchange fees weaker competition leads (higher t) leads to larger pro¯ts.
The indirect e®ect works via the interchange fees. Weaker competition leads
to smaller interchange fees which impact negatively on pro¯ts. In this model,
the indirect e®ect dominates, and hence pro¯ts are higher when competition
is tough in the case of a coalition.
Comparing pro¯ts with and without coalition we ¯nd:
Result 2 Suppose banks choose the interchange fee cooperatively, then banks
do always form a coalition.
Proof. Banks form a coalition if 1
2(V + P) ¡ 1
4t > 1
2t + P
9 which can be
expressed as V > 3
2t ¡ 7
9P. Under assumption 1 this condition is always
ful¯lled.
The intuition behind result 2 is simple. By forming a coalition and aban-
doning direct ATM charges, banks can implement the welfare optimal level
of ATM use. The associated surplus can then be extracted via high account
fees.
6 Welfare analysis
This section considers the welfare implications. We analyze the impact of
ATM coalitions on consumer surplus and total welfare and ask whether there
are Government interventions that could improve the market outcome.
Consumer surplus in the case of a coalition and of no coalition, respectively,
are:
CSc = V ¡
5
4
t + P ¡ 2aP; (19)







We de¯ne total welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and banks' pro¯ts:
Wc = V ¡
1
4
t + P; (21)







14Comparing consumer surplus and total welfare with and without coalition,
the following result can be obtained:
Result 3 Welfare analysis with exogenous interchange fee. i) Consumer
surplus is lower under an ATM coalition if a > 2
9. ii) Total welfare is higher
under an ATM coalition.
The results of the welfare analysis are not surprising. Consumer surplus is
lower under a coalition if the interchange fee is su±ciently high as a high
interchange fee lead to high account fees. Contrary, total welfare is higher
with an ATM coalition. For total welfare high account fees do not matter as
they constitute transfers between consumers and banks. Relevant for total
welfare is only ATM use. When banks charge transaction fees, ATM usage
is ine±ciently low (see section 3), contrary when banks do not charge fees
ATM use is at the e±cient level. Hence, in consequence, the ATM coalition
maximizes total welfare.
When the interchange fee is chosen endogenously by banks, our welfare
results change to:
Result 4 Welfare analysis with endogenous interchange fee. i) Consumer
surplus is lower under an ATM coalition. ii) Total welfare is higher under
an ATM coalition.
The implications for total welfare are unchanged. However, when banks set
the interchange fee collectively, consumers are unambiguously worse o® as
the interchange fee is set in such a way that the marginal consumer is ex-
tracted any surplus. Thus, from a consumer's point of view ATM coalitions
among banks should be prohibited.
Our welfare analysis points to the potential of a Government intervention
via regulation of the interchange fee. Interchange fees could be regulated in
such a way that banks still favor the agreement but leave consumer with a
higher surplus. In this model a good intervention would be to regulate the
interchange fee at a level of a = 1
9 (or slightly above). In this case banks
would form a coalition and hence total welfare is maximal. Also consumer
surplus is highest, constrained only by inducing banks to form a coalition.
Note that in this model the interchange fee should be regulated at a higher
level than the costs for providing ATM services.
7 Asymmetric networks
In the analysis above, we have assumed that ATM networks of both banks
are symmetric. This section extends the base model to banks with asym-
15metric network sizes. We now assume that bank 1 operates a larger network,
that is, P1 > P2.10 By introducing banks with di®erent ATM network sizes
we add an aspect of vertical di®erentiation into the model. In the case banks
do not form a coalition joining a bank with a larger network is bene¯cial
for consumers as they have more opportunities to withdraw cash without
charges. In the case of a coalition the aspect of vertical di®erentiation is not
present. Consumers can use both banks' networks without charges.
No strategic ATM Coalition
We repeat the analysis of the base model starting with the case of no coali-
tion.
As consumers are locked in, transaction fees are unchanged to the base
model. However, consumer now care for who owns a larger network. Con-
sumers derive the following utility levels when joining bank 1 and bank 2,
respectively:














As P1 > P2, bank 1 o®ers ceteris paribus a higher utility to depositors.
Equilibrium account fees are then:
F1 = 1 +
5
27
(P1 ¡ P2); (25)
and
F2 = 1 ¡
5
27
(P1 ¡ P2): (26)
Bank 1 charges a higher account fee due to its larger network. Additionally,
bank 1 has a larger market share, leading to higher pro¯ts from account
fees. From ATM transactions both banks earn the same income as margins


























(P1 ¡ P2)2: (28)
10Without loss of generality and for ease of exposition from now on we normalize trans-





11Bank 1 receives a larger fraction of ATM income from surcharge fees than from foreign
fees. Bank 2 receives more from foreign fees than from surcharging.
16Strategic ATM coalition
Now suppose that banks have formed an ATM coalition, that is, banks do
not charge direct transaction fees for ATM services. Hence, consumers do
not care about who owns the network and hence the aspect of vertical di®er-
entiation present in the case of no coalition disappears. Consequently and
in contrast to the case without a coalition, banks charge identical account
fees: F = 1 + a(P1 + P2). However, as bank 1 has a larger network than
bank 2, it receives more income from ATM transactions. Bank 1 receives
interchange fees of 1
2a(P1 ¡ P2) while bank 2 has an out°ow of the same
amount.











Note that even in the case of asymmetric networks both banks bene¯t from
a higher interchange. However, there are two e®ects at work. First, a
higher interchange fee leads to higher account fees which is positive for both
banks. Second, a higher interchange fee leads to higher income from ATM
transactions for the larger bank 1, and to lower income for bank 2. For the
large bank, both e®ects are positive. For the smaller bank, the two e®ects
oppose each other, yet, the account fee e®ect dominates. The interchange
fee that maximizes pro¯ts for both banks is a = 1























The incentives to form a coalition
Banks now face di®erent incentives to form a coalition. A coalition can only
be achieved if it leads to higher pro¯ts for both banks. Comparing pro¯ts,






























17Note that a1 > a2. That is the bank with the smaller network has a larger
incentive to form a coalition. Hence, when a < a2, no bank wants to form
a coalition. When a2 · a < a1 only the small bank wants to establish a
coalition. Thus, no agreement emerges and the coalition is not established.
When a ¸ a1, both banks agree to ban direct ATM transaction fees on
depositors. Hence, the strategic ATM coalition is formed.
As a1 > a2, we notice that the smaller bank gains more from forming a
coalition. The reason is a re-distribution of customers from the large to the
small bank in case of a coalition. When there is no coalition, consumers
tend to favor the bank with the larger network, thus a small bank has to
reduce account fees. When forming a coalition the smaller bank is no longer
disadvantaged in attracting depositors. Consumers do not care about who
owns an ATM (but only about the size of the entire network). Thus by
forming a coalition, a small bank can increase the account fee as well as
the number of depositors at the expense of the larger competitor. Here our
results di®er from Croft and Spencer (2004). In Croft and Spencer (2004)
large banks gain more from no-surcharging agreements. The reason in their
model is that banks with a larger depositor base receive less revenues from
surcharges.
To study the impact of the degree of asymmetry in network sizes on the
establishment of a coalition, we consider the case where P1 + P2 = 1 ,
P1 = 1 ¡ P2, that is, each consumer ¯nds an ATM for sure. We make this
assumption to ¯lter out the impact of an increase in overall network size and
focus on the impact of asymmetry leaving coverage constant. As P1 > P2,
an increase in P2 leads to more equal network sizes. It can be shown that
@a1
@P2 < 0. Hence, the establishment of a coalition is more likely when ATM
networks are more equal.
Summarizing our results:
Result 5 Suppose bank 1 operates a larger network than bank 2 and the in-
terchange fee is given exogenously. Then, i) banks form a coalition whenever
a ¸ a1, ii) the bank with a smaller network has a larger incentive to form
an ATM coalition, and iii) more equal network sizes make the establishment
of an ATM coalition more likely.
Now suppose that banks set the interchange cooperatively. Then our result
from the symmetric case carries over, the reason being that the cooperative
interchange fee is high enough to induce both banks to favor a coalition.
Result 6 Suppose bank 1 operates a larger network than bank 2 and the
interchange fee is set cooperatively. Then banks always favor a coalition.
188 Investments in ATM Networks
Until now we have considered the size of ATM networks as exogenously
given. In this section, we study the incentives to invest in the size of ATM
networks. We modify our game as follows: After banks have made network-
wide decisions (form a coalition, interchange fees) in stages 1 and 2, banks
choose non-cooperatively the size of their networks. The remainder of the
game remains unchanged. The number of ATMs deployed by bank i is ni.
There is a unit cost for deploying ATMs which is given by c.
We assume that the probability of encountering an ATM of bank i depends





Banks with a larger network have more ATM customers. Implicitly, by using
this speci¯c functional form, we assume that each consumer ¯nds an ATM
as Pi + Pj = 1.
In the analysis, we can make use of the results in section 7 on asymmetric
network sizes. When banks have not formed a coalition, banks pro¯ts at the














(Pi ¡ Pj)2 ¡ cni; (36)
where Pi and Pj are as de¯ned above. Each bank chooses the number
of ATMs to maximize pro¯ts non-cooperatively. The symmetric number
of ATMs deployed by each bank is then nn = 7
108c, leading to pro¯ts of
¦n = 53
108.
Assuming that banks have formed a coalition, equation (29) gives banks
pro¯ts' relevant for the ATM deployment decision. Subtracting costs of




+ aPi ¡ cni: (37)
The resulting equilibrium deployment is nc = a
4c. A higher interchange fees
leads to more investment. Inserting the optimal interchange set collectively
by the duopoly banks, ATM deployment is nc = V ¡1
4c . Pro¯ts are then
¦c = 1
2 + V ¡1
4 = V +1
4 .
12The same functional form is used in Donze and Dubec (2006).
19Comparing ATM deployment in the two di®erent states and analyzing the
decision to establish a strategic coalition, we get:
Result 7 i) In the case of an exogenous interchange fee, ATM deployment
is higher when banks have formed a coalition if a > 7=27. ii) In the case of
an endogenous interchange fee, ATM deployment is higher when banks have.
formed a coalition. iii) Banks do always favor a coalition.
This result shows that high interchange fees may provide a powerful mecha-
nism to invest in ATM network size. This has also been shown in Donze and
Dubec (2006). In the case banks have formed a coalition investment is higher
than in the case of no coalition if the interchange fee is su±ciently high. The
reasons for deployment di®er with and without coalition. In the case of a
coalition, banks do so to receive interchange fees from non-depositors. In
contrast, when banks have not formed a coalition, banks invest in ATMs to
attract depositors.
We ¯nd that for any positive interchange fee banks prefer to form a coalition
and not to charge ATM customers directly, even though investment costs
may be higher. When banks have formed a coalition, a high interchange fee
has two e®ects on bank pro¯ts. First, it relaxes competition and second,
it induces higher investment. However, the overall e®ect on pro¯ts is still
positive and banks still prefer the highest possible interchange fee.
9 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives to form coalitions among
banks in ATM markets. A coalition is here a contract between banks that
bans direct fees on consumers for ATM transactions. The formation of such
a coalition has two opposing e®ects on banks' pro¯ts. First, banks do not
earn revenues from ATM transactions. Second, banks can increase account
fees as competition between them is weakened by the use of interchange fees.
Considering banks with equal network sizes, we show that the formation of
a coalition bene¯ts banks if the interchange fee is high enough. In the case
of banks choosing jointly the interchange this always the case. Concerning
welfare, agreements between banks to ban ATM usage fees may be detri-
mental for consumer welfare. The impact on total welfare is positive. When
banks operate ATM networks of di®erent sizes, it turns out that banks with a
smaller network have a stronger incentive to enter coalitions. It also emerges
that the presence of ATM coalitions is more likely in markets where banks
have more similar network sizes. When banks can invest in their networks,
20we ¯nd that there is more investment in the case of a coalition provided
interchange fees are high enough.
The present model abstracts from some issues. We focus on a duopoly
model, however, empirical studies, for instance Hannan (2007), show that
market structure and pricing structure is linked. To complement these em-
pirical results it would be interesting to extend existing theoretical models
to allow for an endogenous number of banks in di®erent pricing regimes.
Another issue that has received less attention in the literature is the entry
of independent service operators (ISO) who operate ATM networks but do
not o®er other bank services. The extent of ISO varies among countries. For
example in the UK and Australia, the number of ATMs provided by these
operators increased hugely in numbers. Subsequent research could study
how the the structure of ATM pricing a®ects entry of ISOs.
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